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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE MEETS THE DELID 
SANDS FLOWER-LOVING FLY 
John Copeland Nagle* 
God in His wisdom made the fly 
And then forgot to tell us why. 
- Ogden Nashl 
The protagonist in our story has six legs, is one inch long, and 
dies two weeks after it emerges from the ground. To the untrained 
eye, the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly looks like, well, a big fly. 
Entomologists know better. This particular fly can hover like a 
hummingbird as it uses its long tubular nose to extract nectar from 
flowers. It can only live in particular fine soils - the Delhi sands 
- that appear in patches over a forty square mile stretch from 
Colton to Ontario, California. Today only a few hundred Delhi 
Sands Flower-Loving Flies survive in less than a dozen such patches 
located in an eight-mile radius split by I-10 and the Southern Pacific 
railroad tracks. Therein lies the Fly's claim to fame. Of the 80,000 
known species of flies, the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly is the 
only one to be listed as endangered under the Endangered Species 
Act,2 and it is the only fly to divide the D.C. Circuit three ways 
concerning the meaning of the Commerce Clause.3 
* VISiting Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School, 1998-1999; Associate Professor, 
Seton Hall University School of Law Gohn.c.nagle.8@nd.edu). B.A. 1982, Indiana, Bloom­
ington; J.D. 1986, University of Michigan. - Ed. This essay benefitted immeasurably from 
faculty presentations at the University of Minnesota Law School and the Notre Dame Law 
School. I am also grateful for the comments and thoughts shared by Howard Erichson, Bill 
Funk, Abner Greene, Edward Hartnett, Stephen Johnson, Bill Kelley, Lisa Nagle, and J.B. 
Ruhl,· and for the rese.arch assistance of Laura Amos and Paul Vance. I am indebted to my 
father, Jim Nagle, for his memory of Ogden Nash's poems. 
1. OGDEN NAsH, The Fly, in GooD INTENTIONS 173 (1942). 
2. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered 
Status for the Delhi Sands Flower-loving Fly, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,881 (1993) (to be codified at 30 
C.F.R. pt. 17:11 (n)) [hereinafter FWS Fly Listing Decision]. To see a nice color picture of 
the Fly, see Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly (Diptera Apioceridae) <http:// 
shanana.berkeley.edu/essig/endins/raphiomi.htm>. For more detail about the life of the Fly, 
see FWS Fly Listing Decision, supra, at 49,881-82; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, TECHNI­
CAIJAGENCY DRAFI' RECOVERY PLAN FOR TiiE DELHI SANDS FLOWER-LoVING FLY 
(Rhaphiomidas tenninatus abdonimalis) 1-2 (1996) [hereinafter FLY DRAFI' REcoVERY 
PLAN]; Kenneth J. Kingsley, Behavior of the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly (Diptera: 
Mydidae), A Little-Known Endangered Species, 89 ANNALS ENTOMOL. SoCY. AM. 883, 883-
91 (1996). 
3. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998). 
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The Fly ended up in court because people wanted to use its 
habitat for other purposes. That anyone would want this land, 
home to a notorious hazardous waste site as well as the interstate 
and the railroad,4 is rather surprising. But the Fly earned the status 
of endangered under the Endangered Species Act (BSA) on the 
day before San Bernardino County planned to begin construction 
of a state-of-the-art hospital in the middle of the Fly's dwindling 
habitat.5 The BSA prohibits the "tak[ing]" of any endangered spe­
cies,6 which has been interpreted to include "significant habitat 
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures" a 
member of the species.7 The county responded to the ESA's tak­
ings provision by modifying its building plans, creating an eight-acre 
Fly refuge, and establishing a corridor of land connecting one Fly 
colony to another. The county made further concessions in ex­
change for permission to build an electrical power station for the 
hospital. But when the county learned that the Fly stood in the way 
of its plans to redesign an intersection used by emergency vehicles 
traveling to the hospital, the county filed suit challenging the appli­
cation of the ESA to the habitat of the Fly. The county was joined 
by the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) and several 
other trade groups that wished to build in the Fly's habitat, and by 
several municipalities that complained about the Fly's interference 
with their financial stability, land use planning, and projects of their 
own.8 
Disdaining more conventional weapons for fighting flies, the 
county turned to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 
Lopez.9 Lopez was the first case since the New Deal to hold that a 
4. See William Booth, Developers Wish. Rare Fly Would Buzz Off: Flower-Loving Insect 
Becomes Symbol for Opponents of Endangered Species Act, WASH. PosT, Apr. 4, 1997, at Al 
(noting that "the fly today shares its shrinking home with a cement quarry, a petroleum tank 
farm, a sewage plant and a Superfund site known ominously as the Stringfellow Acid Pits," 
and quoting a local official who characterized the site as "a bunch of dirt and weeds"). 
5. See FWS Fly Listing Decision, supra note 2; see also National Assn. of Home Builders, 
130 F.3d at 1060 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (noting that the FWS listed the Fly on the day 
before construction of the hospital was scheduled to begin). 
6. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1994). 
7. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1997); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 
Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding the FISh & Wildlife Service regulation defining 
"take" to include certain habitat destruction). 
8. For the saga of the Fly and its competitors, see National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 
F.3d at 1043-45; 130 F.3d at 1060 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Endangered Species Act 
Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Drinking Water, Fisheries, and Wildlife 
of the Senate Comm. on Envt. and Public Works, 104th Cong. 804-06 (1995) (statement of 
Randy Scott, Planning Manager, San Bernardino County); Booth, supra note 4, at Al; David 
G. Savage, Buzz Over a Fly Presents Challenge to Species Act, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1998, at 
Al. 
9. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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federal statute exceeded congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199010 suffered that 
fate because it fell outside all three categories of activities within 
the scope of the Commerce Clause: (1) the use of the channels of 
interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate com­
merce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) activi­
ties that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.11 The 
Act lacked a jurisdictional statement that would have limited its ap­
plication to cases involving interstate commerce, Congress did not 
make any :findings about the impact that guns near schools have on 
interstate commerce, and the Court itself could not see any such 
connection even through the lens of the deferential rational basis 
test. The Court's approach precluded both the narrower formula­
tion of Justice Thomas, who criticized the extension of congres­
sional power to activities that merely substantially affect interstate 
commerce,12 and the broader formulation of Justice Breyer, who 
believed that guns near schools did substantially affect interstate 
commerce.13 The Court responded to Justice Breyer by insisting 
that any Commerce Clause test must leave some activities beyond 
the scope of federal authority; put negatively, a test that allows 
Congress to regulate anything in the name of interstate commerce is 
contrary to the limited, enumerated powers given Congress by the 
Constitution.14 
Whether Lopez marks a dramatic shift in Commerce Clause ju­
risprudence or is instead destined to be a "but see" citation remains 
to be seen. The Court itself has already declined the invitation to 
invalidate statutes in several cases involving connections to inter­
state commerce that seemed even more tenuous than that in 
Lopez.15 The lower federal courts have produced numerous split 
opinions regarding the consistency of a diverse group of federal 
10. 18 u.s.c. § 922{q) {1990). 
11. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. 
12. See 514 U.S. at 584-602 {Thomas, J., concurring). 
13. See 514 U.S. at 618-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
14. See 514 U.S. at 564 (protesting that Justice Breyer's dissent was "unable to identify 
any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not"); 514 U.S. at 567 (stating that 
the Court was unwilling to conclude that "the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not 
presuppose something not enumerated"). 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 {1995) (upholding the application 
of RICO to a defendant who invested illegal drug proceeds in a gold mine); Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 {1995) (sustaining the application of the Federal Arbi­
tration Act to a termite protection contract signed by an Alabama homeowner); see generally 
Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 731-38 (1995) {describing these 
cases and other recent Co=erce Clause cases in which the Court denied certiorari). 
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statutes with the Commerce Clause.16 Federal environmental legis­
lation has survived similar broad challenges so far, but some judges 
have been willing to hold that particular applications of the Com­
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA) and of the wetlands provisions of the Clean Water 
Act violate the Commerce Clause.17 
San Bernardino and its friends attacked the application of the 
BSA to the protection of the Fly against this backdrop. They lost, 
first in the district court and then in a 2-1 decision in the D.C. Cir­
cuit.18 But unlike the district court and earlier courts to decide 
Commerce Clause challenges to the BSA, the three judges on the 
D.C. Circuit offered strikingly diverse explanations for why the 
BSA could - or could not - constitutionally require the protec­
tion of the Fly's habitat. Judge Wald determined that the ESA's 
takings provision fit within the first Lopez category - the use of 
the channels of interstate commerce - because Congress can con-
16. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 
1997) (2-1 decision upholding the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Bailey, 
115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997) (2-1 decision upholding the Child Support Recovery Act), cert 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 866 (1997); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995) (2-1 deci­
sion upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act); United States v. Bishop, 66 
F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) (2-1 decision upholding the federal carjacking statute). Such deci­
sions caused the opponents of the ESA's application to the Fly to declare that "[t]he judges 
of the lower federal courts . . .  haven't the foggiest idea what [the Supreme] Court meant 
when it decided Lopez." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, National Assn. of Home Build­
ers v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
17. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) (invalidating a regulation 
extending the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act to waters whose degradation "could" affect 
interstate commerce); United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (Hand, 
J.) (holding that CERCLA cannot be applied to an inactive hazardous waste site with no 
ongoing connection to interstate commerce), revd., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997); see also 
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1993) (Manion, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (concluding that the Commerce Clause prohibits the Clean Water Act from reach­
ing isolated wetlands). Additionally, several commentators have expressed doubts about the 
consistency of the BSA and other environmental statutes with the Commerce Clause post­
Lopez. See J. Blanding Holman IV, After United States v. Lopez: Can the Clean Water Act 
and the Endangered Species Act Survive Commerce Clause Attack?, 15 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 139, 
141 (1995) (concluding that the ESA's takings provision "is at risk" until Congress acts to 
clarify the economic value of biodiversity); Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A 
Misstep, but Hardly Epochal for Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 
78-79 (1996) (observing that "[f]ederal regulation of endangered species that are not articles 
of commerce may be the most difficult environmental regulation to justify after Lopez"); 
David A. Linehan, Note, Endangered Regulation: Why the Commerce Clause May No 
Longer Be Suitable Habitat for Endangered Species and Wetlands Regulation, 2 TEx. REv. L. 
& PoL. 365, 367 (1998) (concluding that the ESA's takings prohibition is "no longer defensi­
ble as [a] proper exercise[ ] of congressional power under the Commerce Clause"); see also 
Suzanna Sherry, The Barking Dog, 46 CASE W.  REs. L. REv. 877, 881 (1996) (describing the 
destruction of endangered species habitat by private landowners as "an activity only specula­
tively related to interstate commerce"). 
18. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 949 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1996), 
affd., 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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trol the transportation of endangered species and because Congress 
can keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral 
uses.19 She also found that the takings provision fit within the third 
category - activities that substantially affect interstate commerce 
- because the statute protects biodiversity for current and future 
interstate commerce and because the statute avoids destructive in­
terstate competition with respect to endangered species.20 Judge 
Henderson's concurrence agreed only that the statute satisfied the 
third category, albeit for different reasons than those articulated by 
Judge Wald.21 Judge Sentelle would have held that the ESA cannot 
be constitutionally applied to the habitat of the Fly because the case 
fell outside all of the Lopez categories.22 
The explanation for their different explanations, in turn, is quite 
simple: each of the D.C. Circuit judges focused on a different ques­
tion. Judge Wald asked whether there was a sufficient relationship 
between endangered species and interstate commerce, concluding 
that there was. Judge Henderson asked whether there was a rela­
tionship between the hospital and interstate commerce, again con­
cluding that there was. By contrast, Judge Sentelle asked whether 
there was a relationship between the Fly and interstate commerce, 
concluding that there was not.23 
This article explores who asked the right question. Whether the 
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to protect the habitat of the 
Fly depends upon the kind of connection to interstate commerce 
that is required. As discussed in Part I, the ESA constitutionally 
protects the habitat of the Fly if the appropriate inquiry examines 
the relationship between endangered species and interstate com­
merce, or the relationship between the hospital (or the housing de­
velopments sought by the NAHB) and interstate commerce. If, on 
the other hand, there must be a relationship between the Fly and 
19. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046-49 (Wald, J.). 
20. See 130 F.3d at 1049-57 (Wald, J.). 
21. See 130 F.3d at 1057-60 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
22. See 130 F.3d at 1060-67 {Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
23. This is somewhat of an exaggeration insofar as Judge Wald did note the impact of the 
hospital on interstate co=erce, see 130 F.3d at 1048, while Judge Henderson relied upon the 
narrower view of the impact of endangered species on interstate co=erce as an alternative 
basis for her concurrence see 130 F.3d at 1058-59. I describe their focus as being on endan­
gered species or the hospital, respectively, because Judge Wald spent much more time dis­
cussing endangered species than the hospital, whereas Judge Henderson's opinion gave the 
two topics about equal weight despite the nearly exclusive focus on endangered species 
adopted by the other courts and co=entators to consider the question. See, e.g., Building 
Indus. Assn. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 906-08 (D.D.C. 1997) (explaining the relationship 
between endangered species and interstate co=erce); Johnson, supra note 17, at 77-82 {fo· 
cusing on the relationship betwe�n endangered species and interstate co=erce). 
October 1998] The Commerce Clause Meets The Fly 179 
interstate commerce, the lack of such a relationship dooms the ap­
plication of the BSA to the habitat of the Fly. The same result 
would obtain for the hundreds of other species that are not in­
volved in, and exert no influence on, interstate commerce. 
That these questions are raised in the context of the protection 
of an endangered species should not be surprising. Unlike the ac­
tivities at issue in most of the Court's Commerce Clause cases, 
there is no commerce in the Fly: no one buys it, sells it, or uses it to 
travel interstate. It is, quite simply, noncommercial. Yet Congress 
places a tremendous value on the protection of all endangered spe­
cies,24 so Congress wants to prevent the Fly from disappearing from 
the earth, whether or not the Fly ever plays a noticeable role in 
human affairs. The Commerce Clause dilemma is whether Con­
gress has the power to protect something that is very rare, very val­
uable, and seemingly entirely uninvolved with commerce between 
the states. It is a dilemma that transcends the preservation of en­
dangered species and implicates federal efforts to protect historic 
buildings, scenic landscapes, works of art, and other valuable 
resources. 
It is also a dilemma that has received little attention. The many 
pages that have been written regarding the proper understanding of 
the Commerce Clause have largely addressed the meaning of "com­
merce," the appropriate judicial role with respect to the clause, and 
similarly abstract questions. Those are not my concerns here. In­
deed, while I presuppose the existence of some judicial role in this 
context, I also am willing to assume that both Lopez and New Deal 
cases such as Wickard v. Filburn25 are correct. But however one 
views the extent of the relationship to interstate commerce de­
manded by the Commerce Clause, the question of exactly what 
must be related to interstate commerce remains. That is what di­
vided the court in the Fly case, and it is what this article considers. 
Part II examines three facets of that issue. First, section II.A 
considers the aggregation principle, made famous by Wickard, that 
allows Congress to consider the cumulative effect of similar activi­
ties on interstate commerce. What Wickard does not answer is the 
level of generality that Congress is permitted to use when aggregat-
24. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.153, 174, 184 (1978) {observing that Con­
gress wanted to afford endangered species "the highest of priorities" and to "reverse the 
trend toward extinction, whatever the cost"). 
25. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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ing "similar" activities.26 The question raised by the Fly case is 
whether a statute based on a broader aggregation can constitution­
ally be applied to a narrow category that lacks the required substan­
tial relationship to interstate commerce. If Congress can treat all 
endangered species alike and thereby regulate every species despite 
its lack of any connection to interstate commerce, then the scope of 
the Commerce Clause will be truly unlimited. I doubt Congress can 
do so. Second, section II.B asks whether Congress can rely upon 
the potential effect that an activity will have on interstate com­
merce. There are powerful reasons why Congress would want to do 
so: the value of many endangered species, for example, may not be 
known for years to come. Yet this seems problematic because it, 
too, could allow Congress to regulate anything because anything 
might affect interstate commerce someday. I suggest a middle 
ground that would empower Congress to act only if it can point to 
evidence providing a reasonable basis for believing that a particular 
resource will contribute to interstate commerce one day. Third, 
section II.C considers which activity must be related to interstate 
commerce. The choice of activities is important precisely because it 
often determines whether there is a sufficient relationship to inter­
state commerce to trigger the Commerce Clause. The problem is 
deciding whether the congressional means must be related to inter­
state commerce, or the congressional ends, or either, or both. The 
means of the ESA - in this case, prohibiting any building in the 
Fly's habitat - have an obvious effect on interstate commerce, 
while the effect of the ends - preserving endangered species - is 
harder to prove. But either one should suffice. That still leaves 
some activities - imagine children walking barefoot through the 
Fly's habitat - beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause, which 
preserves the Lopez insistence that a proper Commerce Clause test 
distinguish between those activities that Congress can regulate and 
those it cannot. 
I. THE RIGHT ANSWERS 
Judge Wald, Judge Henderson, and Judge Sentelle answered the 
Commerce Clause question raised by the application of the ESA to 
the Fly's habitat by focusing upon endangered species, the hospital, 
and the Fly, respectively. Before considering which inquiry is cor­
rect, 'it is helpful to see where each path leads. The three different 
26. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 226 (3d ed. 1996) (suggesting 
that neither Wickard nor Lopez say how one determines what activities are sufficiently simi· 
Iar to be aggregated). 
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choices raise a number of questions about the necessary relation­
ship to interstate commerce. These questions produce conflicting 
answers, so the fate of the ESA's protection of the Fly's habitat 
depends on which is the right question to ask. 
A. The Relationship Between the Fly and Interstate Commerce 
1. The Actual Relationship Between the Fly and Interstate 
Commerce 
Suffice it to say that the Fly does not offer a noticeable contribu­
tion to the economy of San Bernardino County or anywhere else. 
The Fly does not possess any known medical value. Tourists do not 
flock to see it. People do not eat it. Scientists have searched in vain 
for any contributions that the Fly makes to human life. It is not the 
subject of the popular imagination or a key performer in the popu­
lar culture.21 
Nonetheless, the government bravely suggested that the Fly was 
active in interstate commerce, and the district court agreed. That 
relationship was revealed by (1) the exhibition of the Fly in at least 
three museums located outside of California, (2) at least two in­
stances where people outside of California purchased a Fly via an 
insect sales catalog, (3) people who traveled to California to ob­
serve and study the Fly, and (4) articles about the Fly in scientific 
joumals.28 These are relationships to interstate commerce, but it is 
hard to maintain that they are the substantial relationships needed 
to invoke the Commerce Clause. Nor would other hypothetical­
but easily manufactured - relationships suffice. The fact that I 
have plane tickets in hand to travel to California to visit the Fly 
may get me standing to object to any action that would harm the 
27. Of course all flies suffer from this last indignity, not just the Delhi Sands Flower­
Loving Fly. See FLY DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 2, at 35 (proposing a public rela­
tions campaign "aimed at dispelling the public's automatic association with, and disdain for, 
house flies"). For some of the rare instances in which flies have gained some popular atten­
tion, see THE FLY (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1986) (starring Geena Davis and Jeff 
Goldblum); THE FLY (Twentieth Century Fox Ftlm Corp. 1958) (starring Vmcent Price); and 
my personal favorite, MIKE McCUNToCK, A FLY WENT BY (1958). 
28. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 949 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1996), 
affd., 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Brief for the Appellees at 32-33, National Assn. of 
Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (No.96-5354) [hereinafter U.S. 
Brief]; accord FWS Fly Listing Decision, supra note 2, at 49,885 (noting that "[a]lthough flies 
in general are not especially popular with collectors, Rhaphiomidas flies [which includes the 
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly] are prized because of their unusual size, coloration, and 
rarity"); Booth, supra note 4, at Al (quoting the scientist who petitioned for the listing of the 
Fly under the ESA as saying, "If you see a live one flying around you don't soon forget it. 
It's spectacular."); Endangered! Delhi Sands Fly <http:l/www.amnh.org/Exhibition/Expedi­
tion/Endangered/fl.y/fl.y.html> (feature on the Fly published at the American Museum of Nat­
ural History's web site). 
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Fly,29 but it will not trigger the power of Congress to invoke the 
Commerce Clause. Likewise, the availability of souvenirs depicting 
a seemingly obscure endangered species should not tie the species 
to interstate commerce because the ability to market products fea­
turing a species may actually be enhanced if the species becomes 
extinct. Perhaps the most telling criticism of the adequacy of these 
relationships is that Judge Wald abandoned any contention that the 
Fly itself actually affects interstate commerce, despite her various 
other theories supporting the reach of the ESA's takings provision 
in this case. 
It is unlikely, therefore, that the Fly can be shown to have an 
actual, substantial relationship with interstate commerce. But even 
if one determined that the evidence that the district court recited 
was sufficient, that would not resolve the constitutionality of the 
ESA in other cases. Other endangered species are harder to con­
nect to interstate commerce than the Fly. The primary habitat of 
the recently listed Peck's cave amphipod is "a zone of permanent 
darkness" in a single underground aquifer in Texas.30 The 
Cowhead Lake tui chub is a three inch minnow with no known 
commercial or recreational value that is found only in one three 
mile stretch of water in rural northern California.31 The Deseret 
milk-vetch is even more reclusive, thought to be extinct for seventy­
two years prior to its rediscovery on one 300-acre site in central 
Utah.32 There are many such species that survive only in one state, 
that were long thought to be extinct, that are quite similar in func­
tion to other species, or for which there is no discernible commerce 
- and there are some species that possess all of those characteris­
tics. Indeed, the litigation over the Fly itself has already prompted 
landowners to claim that the federal government lacks the authority 
to list the Illinois cave amphipod because that species does not af-
29. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992); 504 U.S. at 579 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
30. See Endangered and Threatened \Vildlife and Plants; Final Rule to List Three 
Aquatic Invertebrates in Comal and Hays Counties, TX, as Endangered, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,295, 
66,296 (1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
31. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Endangered Status 
for the Cowhead Lake Thi Chub, 63 Fed. Reg. 15,152, 15,152-53 (1998) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 17). Note that the proposal to list the species has not yet become final. 
32. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Threatened Status for 
the Plant Astragalus Desereticus (Deseret milk-vetch), 63 Fed. Reg. 4,207 (1998) (to be codi­
fied at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (hereinafter FWS Deseret Milk-Vetch Listing]. Note that the plant 
appears to be tasty to cattle, see id. at 4,209, and that plants do not receive the protection of 
the ESA's takings prohibition, although plants on federal land cannot be removed, mali­
ciously damaged, or destroyed, see 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1994). 
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feet interstate commerce.33 So even if one would strain to identify a 
connection between the Fly and interstate commerce, someday an­
other case involving an even more obscure species would raise the 
same questions. 
2. The Potential Relationship Between the Fly and Interstate 
Commerce 
Judge Wald speculated that "it is not beyond the realm of possi­
bility" that the Fly could contribute to the pollination of America's 
farms.34 Likewise, one would expect that scientists could surely 
learn something from the Fly, especially since the Delhi Sands 
Flower-Loving Fly is the last subspecies of its species, and one of 
only a few left in its zoological family.35 The decision to protect the 
Fly also recognizes the importance of the continuing availability of 
a wide variety of species to interstate commerce,36 a variety that 
demands a large number of species but no one species in particular. 
Judge Wald wrote that "diminishing a natural resource that could 
otherwise be used for present and future commercial purposes" ties 
all species, including the Fly, to interstate commerce.37 More sar­
castically, Judge Sentelle's concern about the consequences that 
would follow if a Fly splattered on the windshield of a car would 
become even greater if the car was traveling across state lines.38 
Each of t�ese arguments relies upon the effect that the Fly could 
have on interstate commerce. There is no evidence to support any 
of the claims at this time. Thus Judge Henderson objected that "it 
is possible that no endangered species will ever realize an uncertain 
potential medical or economic value."39 But it would be presump­
tuous to contend that we know everything there is to know about 
the Fly and its relationship to natural processes or human activities. 
Indeed, the unknown benefits of a species are routinely cited as a 
reason for protecting the species, even when we have not identified 
33. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Fmal Rule to List the Illinois 
Cave Amphipod as Endangered, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,900, 46,902 (1998) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 17) 
34. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
35. See FWS Fly Listing Decision, supra note 2, at 49,881. 
36. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052-53 (Wald, J.). 
37. National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1053 (Wald, J.) ("A species whose 
worth is still unmeasured has what economists call an 'option value' - the value of the 
possibility that a future discovery will make useful a species that is currently thought of as 
useless.") (citing Bryan Norton, Commodity, Amenity, and Morality: The Limits of Quantifi­
cation in Valuing Biodiversity, in BIODIVERSITY 200, 202 (Edward 0. Wilson ed., 1988)). 
38. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1061 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
39. National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
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those benefits to date.40 Thus it is possible that the Fly could yield 
valuable services to human society once we manage to discover 
them. Meanwhile, our inability to know whether the Fly can be 
valuable or not makes us unable to know whether the Fly will sub­
stantially affect interstate commerce or not. 
B. The Relationship Between Endangered Species and Interstate 
Commerce 
1. The Relationship Between Endangered Species Generally and 
Interstate Commerce 
There is a substantial relationship between endangered species 
writ large and interstate commerce. Congress stated that the ESA 
is necessary because "species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of es­
thetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific 
value to the Nation and its people."41 Consider each of these val­
ues. The esthetic and recreational worth of endangered species is 
demonstrated by the millions of people who travel to see whales, 
bald eagles, grizzly bears, whooping cranes, and other rare animals 
throughout the country. Such ecotourism accounts for billions of 
dollars annually in the surrounding communities.42 The ecological 
value of endangered species refers to the role that animals and 
plants play in promoting air and water quality, regulating the cli­
mate, removing unwanted pests, creating and protecting soil, con­
trolling floods and droughts, pollinating crops, protecting the earth 
from ultraviolet rays, and dispersing seeds and nutrients.43 Endan-
40. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1053 {Wald, J.); CHARLES C. MANN 
& MA.rue L. PLUMMER, NoAH's CH01CE: THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES 121-22 
(1995) (observing that "biologists frequently liken the world's biodiversity to a library in 
which the vast majority of books have never been read . . . .  Reading the books in the species 
library once will not be enough . . . . Each generation will profit from reading them over and 
over again."). 
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1531{a)(3) {1994). 
42. See JAMES D. CAUDILL, 1991 ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF NONCONSUMPTIVE WILDLIFE­
RELATED RECREATION 6-7 {1997) (Fish & Wi dlife Service report finding that the 76 million 
Americans who watched, photographed, and fed birds and other wildlife in 1991 spent $18.1 
billion on those activities); U.S. Brief, supra note 28, at 19, 23 & n.12, 26-27 (providing exam­
ples of the co=ercial and tourism value of endangered species); see also John Copeland 
Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1171, 1209-11 (1998) (citing additional sources). 
43. See Endangered Species Act- Bakersfield, California: Hearing Before the Task Force 
on Endangered Species of the House Resources Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1995) (tes­
timony of Arthur D. Unger, Kem-Kaweah Chapter of the Sierra Club) (noting that wasps 
can be used to control certain breeds of files); MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 40, at 123; 
NATURE'S SERVICES (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) (collecting essays written by different 
specialists on the value of services provided by marine ecosystems, freshwater ecosystems, 
forests, and grasslands with respect to soil, pollination, and pest control); Nagle, supra note 
42, at 1211-16 (citing additional sources). 
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gered species serve an educational and scientific function by teach­
ing us about ourselves and the world in which we live. Historical 
benefits come from bald eagles and other species that have a special 
place in our national consciousness.44 
There are other benefits that Congress did not mention in its 
purpose statement for the BSA. Most importantly, endangered 
plants and animals may be an important source of drugs and other 
medical treatments.45 Several plants are being studied in an effort 
to find a cure for AIDS.46 Likewise, the nutritional value of endan­
gered species is seen in the nearly. billion dollars that genes from 
wild plant species add to agricultural production in the United 
States each year.47 
Each of these reasons for protecting endangered species is easily 
linked to interstate commerce. Other reasons, especially the moral 
and religious arguments for the preservation of endangered species, 
are less readily tied to interstate commerce.48 Likewise, many en­
dangered species are found in more than one state, though why that 
serves to justify federal regulation under the Commerce Clause has 
never been clear to me.49 But even without the moral arguments or 
44. Cf., e.g., Nagle, supra note 42, at 1196 (describing the ESA listing of the California 
Red-Legged Frog memorialized by Mark Twain as the Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras 
County). 
45. See Medicinal Uses of Plants; Protection for Plants Under the Endangered Species Act: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm on Envt. and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong. (1993) (discussing the efforts to obtain medicine 
from plants); H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973); S. REP. No. 91-526, at 3 (1969), reprinted in 
1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1415; MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 40, at 120-21 ("Bark from the 
white willow gave us salicin, an ancient version of aspirin; the Grecian foxglove provided 
digoxin, a cardiac medication; bear bile is the origin of ursodiol, a gallstone dissolver; deadly 
nightshade led to atropine, an eye dilator and anti-inflammatory; the velvet bean produced 
L-dopa, a treatment for Parkinson's disease; and everyone knows the story of penicillin, the 
bacteria slayer discovered accidentally in a mold."); EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF 
LIFE 285-86 (1992); Thomas E. Lovejoy, Biodiversity: What ls It?, in BIODIVERSITY II: UN­
DERSTANDING AND PROTECTING OUR BIOLOGICAL REsoURCES 7, 9 (Marjorie L. Reaka­
Kudla et al. eds., 1997). 
46. See Nagle, supra note 42, at 1208 n.140 (citing sources). 
47. See Endangered Species Act: Washington DC - Part II: Hearing Before the Task 
Force on the Endangered Species Act of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. 190 
(1995) (quoting the statement of the National Wtldlife Federation); see also Norman Myers, 
Biodiversity's Genetic Library, in NATURE'S SERVICES, supra note 43, at 256-59 (describing 
how wild com, wild rice, and other rare species can provide food to humans). 
48. See generally Nagle, supra note 42, at 1216-47 (recounting the moral, ethical, and 
religious arguments for protecting endangered species). 
49. Both sides in the Fly case contended that the case had ramifications for all endan­
gered species that live in only one state, though they never explained why species that live in 
more than one state are so plainly within the scope of congressional jurisdiction. A similar 
rule exists with respect to federal regulation of wetlands under the Clean Water Act: if a 
Inigratory bird crosses state lines to a particular body of water, that trip places the water 
within the scope of congressional power. See Elaine Bueschen, Comment, Do Isolated Wet­
lands Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce?, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 931, 941-43 {1997). Why 
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the movement of the species themselves, the utilitarian values cited 
by Congress when it enacted the BSA provide ample grounds for 
concluding that the protection of endangered species bears a sub­
stantial relation to interstate commerce. 
2. The Relationship Between Each Endangered Species and 
Interstate Commerce 
The Commerce Clause would plainly be inadequate as a consti­
tutional basis for the BSA if each protected species were required 
to possess an actual medicinal, nutritional, or other specific value. 
The countless benefits provided by endangered species as a class do 
not mean that every endangered species offers utilitarian benefits. 
Most species are of no nutritional value to humans. Efforts to iden­
tify plants and animals with medicinal uses have identified far more 
useless species than helpful ones. Tourists are far more likely to 
visit bald eagles or manatees than fairy shrimp or the Deseret milk­
vetch. In short, "biodiversity as a whole has overwhelming utilita­
rian value, but most individual species do not."50 
Nonetheless, there are two ways to try to tie every endangered 
species to interstate commerce: the ecosystem argument and the 
biodiversity argument. The ecosystem argument relies upon the 
ecological truism that the loss of any individual species affects the 
ecosystem of which it is part.51 The argument has several problems. 
the fact that a bird or animal crosses state lines of its own volition and without being itself an 
object of interstate commerce is sufficient for Commerce Clause purposes remains unex­
plained. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955, 958 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of cert.) (opining that the assumption that "the self-propelled flight of birds 
across state lines creates a sufficient interstate nexus to justify the Corps' assertion of jurisdic­
tion over any standing water that could serve as a habitat for migratory birds . . .  likely 
stretches Congress' Commerce Clause powers beyond the breaking point"). 
50. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 40, at 133; accord RONALD DWORKIN, L1FB'S 
DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
75 (1993) (arguing that none of the utilitarian arguments for protecting endangered species 
"rings true"); HoLMES RoLSTON III, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHJcs: DUTIES TO AND VALUES IN 
TiiE NATURAL WORLD 130 (1988) (admitting that "[a] substantial number of endangered 
species have no resource value"); Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, 
and What Does That Say About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them 
Constitute "Takings"?, 80 lowA L. Rev. 297, 298 (1995) (acknowledging that "endangered 
species are, for the most part, no more aesthetically attractive than other species, provide 
little historical insight, and are on the margins of recreational demand and scientific discov­
ery"); Nagle, supra note 42, at 1211-16 (describing the lack of utilitarian value of most species 
in greater detail); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endangered Spe­
cies Act - A Noah Presumption and Caution Against Putting Gasmasks on the Canaries in 
the Coalmine, 27 ENVTL. L. 845, 851, 853 (1997) (describing the utilitarian reasons as "make­
weights," and suggesting that the utilitarian arguments are "valid, but seem to be somewhat 
leveraged, grasping at straws. The vast majority of endangered species probably will not cure 
cancer."). 
51. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (Wald, J.) (explaining that "every species has a place in the ecosystem"); National 
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It appears to exaggerate the indispensability of each species within 
an ecosystem. Biologists believe that species come and go all the 
time, so it is hard to contend that the disappearance of any one 
species is catastrophic. Nor does the ecosystem argument explain 
why we need to protect a species that we think we can do without, 
or a species that we thought we were doing without already. For 
example, the nearest relative to the Fly is extinct, with no apparent 
effect on the ecosystem, let alone interstate commerce.s2 Similarly, 
several of the species recently proposed for listing as endangered by 
the Fish and Wildlife Service were long thought to be extinct, again 
without any noticeable adverse consequences for their ecosystem or 
for interstate commerce.s3 It is hard to imagine how a species that 
has a minor effect on the functioning of its ecosystem nonetheless 
exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
And even if a species plays a key role in its ecosystem, the 
ecosystem argument connects the species to interstate commerce 
only if the ecosystem itself contributes to that commerce.s4 An iso­
lated ecosystem may not provide such contributions. Moreover, as 
Mark Sagoff argues, the very notion of a static ecosystem is itself 
problematic.ss If the Fly disappears, the ecosystem will change. 
But if the Fly does not disappear, the ecosystem will change. And if 
Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1059 {Henderson, J., concurring) (agreeing that "[g]iven 
the interconnectedness of species and ecosystems, it is reasonable to conclude that the extinc­
tion of one species affects others and their ecosystems and that the protection of a purely 
intrastate species (like the Delhi Sands Flower-loving Fly) will therefore substantially affect 
land and objects that are involved in interstate co=erce"). 
52. See FWS Fly Listing Decision, supra note 2, at 49,881 (describing the apparent extinc­
tion of the El Segundo Flower-Loving Fly from its historic home in southwestern Los Ange­
les County); Brief for Amici Curiae Center for Marine Conservation, Defenders of Wtldlife, 
Environmental Defense Fund, National Audubon Society, and World Wtldlife Fund at 3, 
National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (No. 96-5354) 
[hereinafter Envtl. Brief], available at <http://www.poplarpub.com/flybrf.txt> (explaining that 
the El Segundo Flower-Loving Fly was wiped out in the 1960's by urban development). 
53. See FWS Deseret Milk-Vetch Listing, supra note 32, at 4,207 (describing a plant that 
had been considered extinct for 72 years); Endangered and Threatened Wtldlife and Plants; 
Proposed Endangered Status for Erigeron decumbens var. decumbens {Willamette Daisy) 
and Fender's Blue Butterfly (lcaricia icarioides fenderi) and Proposed Threatened Status for 
Lupinus sulphureus ssp. kincaidii (Kincaid's lupine), 63 Fed. Reg. 3,863, 3,865 (1998) (noting 
that Fender's blue butterfly was not seen from 1937 to 1989); Endangered and Threatened 
Wtldlife and Plants; Proposed Threatened Status for the Plant Tuelypodium howellii ssp. 
spectabilis (Howell's spectacular thelypody), 63 Fed. Reg. 1,948 {1998) {indicating that a 
flower had been thought extinct until rediscovered in 1980). 
54. See Johnson, supra note 17, at 81 (arguing that the role of a species in its ecosystem 
supports federal regulation "to the extent that endangered species live in ecosystems that 
produce articles of co=erce, or that are used for co=ercial purposes"). 
55. See Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurispmdence Meets the En­
dangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 931-32 (1997) (describing ecosystems as 
"unstructured, transitory, and accidental in nature"); see also id. at 893-902 (noting the diffi­
culties inherent in defining an ecosystem). 
188 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:174 
we manage to actually increase the population of the Fly, the 
ecosystem will change too. Something more, then, is needed to 
ground the Fly's Commerce Clause connection on the health of the 
ecosystem of which it is a part. 
The ecosystem argument works if a species is crucial to an 
ecosystem that plays a role in interstate commerce. The brief filed 
by the environmental groups intervening on behalf of the Fly claims 
just such a connection among the Fly, the Colton Dunes ecosystem 
of which it is a part, and the broader economy.56 The Fly serves at 
least two functions within the Colton Dunes: it pollinates two na­
tive species of plants, and its disappearance sounds an alarm that 
the ecosystem itself is in danger.57 The Colton Dunes is important 
as one of a decreasing number of isolated ecosystems that are cru­
cial to the development of new species. The preservation of the Fly 
will assure the preservation of the Colton Dunes, and the preserva­
tion of isolated ecosystems like that one provides the requisite 
nexus to interstate commerce. But there is no evidence that the 
Colton Dunes itself is substantially related to interstate commerce; 
its significance lies as a representative example of an isolated 
ecosystem. The ecosystem argument on behalf of the Fly, there­
fore, requires a showing that isolated ecosystems in general are a 
permissible object of Commerce Clause legislation, even absent a 
relationship between the Fly's own ecosystem and interstate 
commerce. 
Judge Wald and Judge Henderson relied upon a second ap­
proach for connecting each endangered species to interstate com­
merce. The biodiversity argument insists that the availability of a 
large number of animal and plant species has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.58 Each species is important under this argu­
ment because it is the number of species that matters, not the char­
acteristics of any particular species. Biodiversity is valuable 
56. See Envtl. Brief, supra note 52, at 4, 14. 
51. The "canary-in-the-mine" function of endangered species refers to the way in which 
the loss of one species may serve as an early warning that the rest of the ecosystem is in 
danger. See Nagle, supra note 42, at 1210-11. It is one of the most common justifications for 
the protection of all endangered species. See id. at 1213 (citing sources). 
58. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
{Wald, J.) (concluding that "one of the primary reasons that Congress sought to protect en­
dangered species from 'takings' was the importance of the continuing availability of a wide 
variety of species to interstate commerce"); 130 F.3d at 1052 (Wald, J.) (noting that "current 
and future interstate commerce . . .  relies on the availability of a diverse array of species"); 
130 F.3d at 1053 n.14 {Wald, J.) (asserting that "biodiversity has a real, substantial, and pre­
dictable effect on . . . interstate commerce"); 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring) 
(agreeing that "the loss of biodiversity itself has a substantial effect on our ecosystem and 
likewise on interstate commerce"). 
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because it improves the probability that we will find a species that 
possesses the medicinal, nutritional, or other benefit that we seek. 
The likelihood of finding a cure for AIDS or for cancer is greater if 
there are millions of species of plants to investigate for possible re­
sources instead of only hundreds of species of plants available. Bi­
odiversity's value is further demonstrated by the consequences of 
its absence. Certain kinds of species provide services that would be 
lost even if most other species survived. For example, the Fly is one 
of a decreasing number of "native pollinator" species that pollinate 
crops throughout the country.59 If the number of such native pol­
linator species drops, the billions of dollars of ecological services 
they provide will drop too.60 
C. The Relationship Between the Hospital and Interstate 
Commerce 
The Fly is competing with people who want to occupy its 
habitat. San Bernardino County chose the site for its new regional 
hospital, and it then needed an electrical power station and a rede­
signed intersection to serve the hospital. The construction of the 
hospital presumably used materials and workers from outside of 
California, and once operating the hospital certainly expected to 
attract employees, patients, and students from other states as well.61 
The electrical substation constructed in the Fly's habitat no doubt 
possessed similar connections to interstate commerce.62 So would 
the proposed redesigned traffic intersection.63 The Fly's habitat 
also lies within an enterprise zone established to facilitate commer­
cial investment in the area.64 The residential housing developers 
could be expected to rely upon similar out-of-state materials and 
59. See Envtl. Brief, supra note 52, at 4 (crediting the Fly with pollinating buckwheat, and 
perhaps croton and telegraph weed as well); id. at 14 (noting that "cashews, squash, mangos, 
cardamon, cacao, cranberries, and highbush blueberries are pollinated primarily by wild 
insects"). 
60. See id. at 14. 
61. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F3d at 1048 (Wald, J.); see also 130 F.3d at 
1059 (Henderson, J., concurring) (agreeing that the intersection and the hospital each have 
"an obvious connection with interstate co=erce"). 
62. See Brief for Appellants at 9-11, National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (No. 96-5354) [hereinafter NAHB Brief], available at <http:// 
www.poplarpub.com/fly.txt>. 
63. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1056 (Wald, J.); 130 F.3d at 1059 
(Henderson, J., concurring). 
64. See NAHB Brief, supra note 62, at 13. 
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personnel if they were allowed to proceed with their planned con­
struction at the site.65 
These connections to interstate commerce match the relation­
ships that the Court held sufficient in the cases challenging the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. The fact that seventy-five percent of the guests 
of the Heart of Atlanta Motel were from outside of Georgia and 
the proximity of the motel to two interstate highways provided the 
necessary substantial effect on interstate commerce. 66 The 
purchase of forty-six percent of its meat from a local supplier who 
obtained it from outside of Alabama placed Ollie's Barbeque 
within the scope of the Commerce Clause power.67 The construc­
tion of the hospital, electrical substation, traffic intersection, and 
housing developments in the Fly's habitat are thus substantially re­
lated to interstate commerce. 
* * *  
The foregoing discussion reveals three clear relationships to in­
terstate commerce: (1) endangered species generally are substan­
tially related to interstate commerce by virtue of the many 
utilitarian roles that they perform; (2) someday the Fly could have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce; and (3) the county hospi­
tal and the housing developments desired by the NAHB would rely 
upon materials, employees, and other connections to interstate 
commerce. By contrast, the Fly itself does not have an actual, sub­
stantial effect on interstate commerce, notwithstanding the slight 
connections that the government advanced and the district court 
cited. Whether every endangered species is connected to interstate 
commerce because every species plays an irreplaceable role in its 
ecosystem is harder to judge. There appear to be many species 
without which the ecosystem and interstate commerce would con­
tinue unaffected, but Congress apparently concluded otherwise, and 
that might be sufficient for a court applying the deferential rational 
basis test. The biodiversity argument offers an even more convinc­
ing way of emphasizing the importance of the preservation of every 
species. But the fact that the answers to these questions are not all 
the same shows that the constitutionality of applying the ESA's tak-
65. See Anne M. Peterson, Federal Permit Required Before Tract Constn1ction: Environ­
mentalists Say the Fontana Site is Home of Endangered Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, THE 
PRESs-ENTERPRISE, Aug. 20, 1998, at Bl (reporting that the FWS has notified a developer 
that it must get a permit before building 202 homes on the habitat of the Fly). 
66. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243, 258 (1964). 
67. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296, 300-01 (1964). 
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ings provision to the development of the Fly's habitat depends upon 
the question a court asks. 
II. THE RIGHT QUESTION 
That brings us to the "Jeopardy" portion of the article. Having 
answered the questions posed above, it remains to determine the 
appropriate question. This choice of questions requires considera­
tion of three more questions. First, what is the appropriate level of 
aggregation when comparing an activity to interstate commerce? 
Second, can a potential effect on interstate commerce ever qualify 
as a substantial effect? Third, what is the activity that must be con­
nected to interstate commerce? Surprisingly, the abundant Com­
merce Clause litigation and literature has not resolved any of these 
issues. Lopez and the New Deal cases direct their attention else­
where, as do most academics. Yet these questions offer the possi­
bility of greatly expanding or reducing the scope of the Commerce 
Clause, thereby advancing through the back door arguments that 
constitutional precedent and theory block directly. 
Each of these questions can be answered in a way that affirms 
the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the Fly's habitat and count­
less other activities wholly unrelated to environmental law, but only 
if one is willing to abandon the Court's insistence in Lopez that an 
appropriate test for the Commerce Clause cannot justify federal 
legislation of everything.68 I will not abandon that principle be­
cause it lies at the heart of Lopez. 69 There are, of course, strong 
arguments against that principle and against Lopez itself. Perhaps 
the Court's insistence that there must be some activities that lie 
outside the scope of the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the 
terms of the Commerce Clause itself, as Robert Nagel has argued.7° 
Perhaps another test would better capture the meaning or purpose 
of the Commerce Clause.71 Or perhaps it would be wise for the 
68. See supra text accompanying note 14; see also National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 
F.3d at 1064 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (reading Lopez to require that "the rationale offered to 
support the constitutionality of the statute . . .  has a logical stopping point so that the ration­
ale is not so broad as to regulate on a similar basis all human endeavors, especially those 
traditionally regulated by the states") (citing United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1455-56 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J., dissenting in part)). 
69. See Merritt, supra note 15, at 686 {observing that the rejection of the idea that Con­
gress possesses unlimited power under the Co=erce Clause "may have been the primary 
point of the decision"); id. at 712 (suggesting that the same point "may have been the most 
influential one of all in Lopez"). 
70. See Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 643, 649-55 
{1996). 
71. For two quite different alternative theories, compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 587-89 (1995) {Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting the extension of the Co=erce Clause 
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courts simply to allow Congress to regulate everything that it 
wants.72 Each of those views has its proponents, but I do not wish 
to enter that debate here. Instead, I presume that the general test 
stated in Lopez and the New Deal cases is appropriate, and that 
any understanding of that test must conform to the Court's insis­
tence that the Commerce Clause cannot be interpreted in a way 
that justifies any federal legislation. 
So viewed, the aggregation of all endangered species and the 
reliance upon the Fly's unknown future effect on interstate com­
merce become problematic because both arguments would justify 
any federal legislation. Consideration of the effect of the hospital, 
the traffic intersection, and the construction of housing within the 
Fly's habitat would be acceptable because that approach posits 
other activities that lie outside of the scope of congressional power. 
That means, however, that those other activities - especially the 
proverbial children walking barefoot through the Fly's habitat -
could not be regulated by Congress, and an application of the 
ESA's takings provision in that context would be unconstitutional. 
A. The Aggregation Problem 
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate three 
categories of activity provided that it identifies an adequate rela­
tionship to interstate commerce. One way in which Congress can 
ensure this relationship is by including a jurisdictional provision 
limiting the law's scope to activities that are substantially related to 
interstate commerce. The regulations governing the Clean Water 
Act, for example, rely on such a provision to guarantee that a regu­
lated body of water has the necessary relationship to interstate 
commerce.73 The ESA does not contain a jurisdictional provision, 
but that alone does not invalidate the statute. The second route 
to activities that substantially affect interstate commerce but are not part of interstate com· 
merce themselves) with Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power 
and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554 (1995) (proposing that 
the Commerce Clause should be interpreted to justify federal regulation when there is some 
reason to believe that the states cannot handle the matter themselves), and National Assn. of 
Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054-55 (Wald, J.) (concluding that the ESA's takings provision is 
within the scope of the Commerce Clause because the taking of endangered species results 
from destructive interstate competition). 
72. See Jesse H. Choper, Did Last Term Reveal "A Revolutionary States' Rights Move· 
ment Within the Supreme Court"?, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 663, 669 & n.45 (1996). 
73. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3{a) (Army Corps of Engineers, definition); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3{s). 
This regulation has been read broadly to cover isolated wetlands and other bodies of water 
with tenuous connections to interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 
719, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1993); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 359·60 (9th Cir. 
1990); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 
998 F. Supp. 946 (N.D. ill. 1998); United States v. Sargent County Water Resource Dist., 876 
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available to Congress is to make findings about the effect of mem­
bers of the category on interstate commerce. The BSA contains 
several findings about the importance of endangered species74 and 
about the effects of commercial activity on endangered species,75 
but no findings which describe the effects of endangered species on 
interstate commerce. The findings in the ESA's legislative history 
are more helpful, though, reciting the importance of biodiversity in 
providing potential resources for commerce, medicine, and other 
human activities.76 To no one's surprise, Congress neglected to 
make any findings about the Fly, so the authority to regulate the 
Fly's habitat depends upon Congress's ability to act based on the 
cumulative effect of other endangered species and of biodiversity as 
a whole. 
At first glance, this would seem to be easy because of Wickard v. 
Filburn. 77 For better or worse - and the Lopez majority would 
side with those saying "worse"78 - Wickard has come to stand for 
the proposition that the constitutionality of an exercise of congres­
sional power under the Commerce Clause is measured not by an 
isolated examination of each individual's actions, but by the aggre­
gate effect of all similarly situated actors. This reading of Wickard 
emphasizes that even if the Fly does not exert a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce, it is but one of many endangered species 
whose collective effect on interstate commerce is unquestionably 
substantial. 
Th.at comparison blurs the kind of aggregation that the Court 
employed in Wickard. The statute that Roscoe Filburn was accused 
of violating - the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 - regu­
lated the marketing of tobacco, corn, cotton, rice, peanuts, and 
F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (D.N.D. 1992). But see United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 255-57 (4th 
Cir. 1997); Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 260-62 (7th Cir. 1993). 
74. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1985). . 
75. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(l) (finding that species "have been rendered extinct as a con­
sequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and con­
servation"); H.R. 37, 93d Cong., § 2(a) (1973) (proposing congressional finding that "one of 
the unfortunate consequences of growth and development in the United States and else­
where has been the extermination of some species or subspecies of fish and wildlife"). 
76. See H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 5 (1973) (describing species as "potential resources" that 
"may provide answers to questions which we have not yet learned to ask" and speculating 
about possible medical benefits); S. REP. No. 93-307, at 2 (1973) (indicating that "many of 
these animals perform vital biological services to maintain a 'balance of nature' within their 
environments" and that biological diversity is needed for scientific purposes). 
77. 317 U.S. 111 {1942). For a detailed retelling of the events underlying Wickard, see 
Jim Chen, Foreword: Ftlbum's Forgotten Footnote - Of Farm Team Federalism and Its Fate, 
82 MINN. L. REv. 249, 276-305 {1997). 
78. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (describing Wickard as "perhaps 
the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity"). 
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wheat.79 The specific regulation that applied to Filburn governed 
only wheat. In 1941, Mr. Filburn harvested 239 more bushels of 
wheat than he was allowed by that regulation, but he contended 
that the extra amount was not involved in interstate commerce be­
cause he used it on his own farm for livestock feed and for other 
personal consumption. Justice Jackson's opinion for the unanimous 
Court rejected that argument because the effect of wheat grown for 
personal consumption had an effect on interstate commerce by de­
flating the demand for - and thus the price of - wheat grown 
elsewhere.80 Moreover, the government presented evidence that 
wheat grown for personal consumption was "the most variable fac­
tor in the disappearance of the wheat crop," with more than twenty 
percent of the wheat grown in the United States used for such per­
sonal consumption.81 The cumulative effect of wheat grown for 
personal use did, therefore, yield a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce. 
That result depended upon an aggregation of the wheat grown 
by Filburn for his personal use coupled with the wheat grown by all 
other farmers for their personal use. The relevant category, then, 
was "all wheat grown by farmers for their personal use." This was 
not the broadest possible category. A broader category consistent 
with the reach of the statute would have been "all tobacco, corn, 
cotton, rice, peanuts, and wheat grown by farmers for their personal 
use." An even broader category - albeit one that moves beyond 
the commodities covered by the statute - would have encom­
passed "all agricultural products produced by farmers for their own 
personal use." In other words, the interstate commerce effect 
would be measured by adding Filburn's wheat to Filburn's milk and 
chicken and eggs,82 to the produce of Iowa corn farmers and North 
Carolina tobacco growers and California rice farmers. And it is 
that step that is required to move from the Fly to all endangered 
species. 
Judge Wald appeared to accept the government's argument in 
National Assn. of Home Builders that the appropriate level of ag­
gregation is "all endangered species," the class subject to the ESA's 
79. See Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 
Part Two, 59 HARv. L. REv. 883, 901 (1946). 
80. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124-29. 
81. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127. 
82. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114 (noting that Filburn "for many years past has owned and 
operated a small farm in Montgomery County, Ohio, maintaining a herd of dairy cattle, sell­
ing milk, raising poultry and selling poultry and eggs"). 
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takings provision. 83 Wickard, however, did not go so far as to ag­
gregate all of the statutorily regulated crops with Mr. Filburn's 
wheat. Judge Wald further asserted that Wickard is analogous to 
the Fly case because Congress enacted the BSA to regulate the 
quantity of species, whereas Wickard involved the quantity of 
wheat.84 She is correct that Congress was concerned about the 
quantity of species and that the BSA was designed to protect that 
amount. But as applied to the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, the 
contested provision of the BSA prohibits the taking of any individ­
ual Fly, whether or not the loss of that Fly will result in the extinc­
tion of the species. To be sure, Congress might well want to ban the 
taking of any Fly because the loss of any individual Fly poses a 
serious threat to the existence of the species.85 That, however, is a 
slightly different argument than the one advanced by Justice Jack­
son. Wickard found the requisite connection between interstate 
commerce and the wheat consumed by Mr. Filburn on his own farm 
because there was a relationship between the nationwide demand 
for wheat and the amount of wheat grown for personal use by Mr. 
Filburn and others similarly situated. By contrast, if San Bernar"'­
dino County's hospital or a new housing development wipes out 
one or more Flies without extinguishing the species, there will still 
be the same number of species. The analogy to Wickard requires an 
additional step: it is not sufficient to show that the activities of the 
county and the home builders and all similarly situated parties will 
affeet the number of Flies, but one must also show that their actions 
will affect the number of species. Extinction, in other words, affects 
interstate commerce, but the loss of an individual Fly does not. The 
precarious survival of the Fly suggests that such a fate might quickly 
ensue from the loss of one or more Flies, but the Court has indi-
83. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(Wald, J.) (describing the class to be aggregated as "all similarly situated endangered spe­
cies"); U.S. Brief, supra note 28, at 27 (asserting that "[t]he appropriate analytical framework 
aggregates the effects of all conduct within the class of activities regulated by the challenged 
statutory provision"). It is conceivable that Judge Wald meant to refer to a narrower class 
limited to "similarly situated" endangered species, but she offered no indication of what qual­
ified a species as "similarly situated" to the Fly. 
84. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1049 n.7 (Wald, J.). 
85. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052 n.10 (Wald, J.) (writing that 
"[a]ctivities that threaten a species' existence threaten to reduce biodiversity and thereby. 
have a substantial negative effect on interstate commerce. Thus, the biodiversity rationale 
offered here provides support for the Endangered Species Act only insofar as the Act pre­
vents activities that are likely to cause the elimination of species."). Note that according to 
the government, the opponents of the Fly "appear to concede that if the restrictions of the 
[ESA] are lifted, the Fly will become extinct." U.S. Brief, supra note 28, at 35 n.17. 
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cated a decided reluctance to add any inferences beyond those al­
ready made in Wickard. 86 
The disagreement between Judge Wald and Judge Sentelle 
about whether the protection of the Fly's habitat depends upon the 
interstate effect of endangered species or of the Fly captures but 
two of the possible levels of aggregation. Consider the different 
categories that Congress could adopt in an effort to protect the Fly: 
(1) An individual Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly - Congress could 
decide to protect one individual, and presumably very special, Fly. 
That Congress would take this step for an insect that is visible for 
only two weeks is doubtful, but it is more plausible that another 
animal might receive such consideration. Certain individual ani­
mals, like Hsing-Hsing, the panda at the National Zoo, are objects 
of particular attention apart from their species. (2) A specific popu­
lation of the Fly - Congress could act to protect one colony of Flies 
without extending that protection to other colonies. In fact, the 
ESA extends its protections to specific populations of wildlife and 
fish species that are endangered even if other populations of the 
species are thriving, but insects are not eligible for such treatment.87 
(3) The Fly - Congress could pass the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving 
Fly Act, protecting the survival of the Fly and only the Fly. Obvi­
ously, such a statute has not yet joined the U.S. Code, but analo­
gous statutes already exist. Congress enacted a Bald Eagle 
Protection Act to provide special protection to that one species. 88 
( 4) All flies - The next largest aggregation would protect all spe­
cies of files. This legislation could either protect every fly species 
from extinction, or more broadly, it could protect all files from 
86. The final paragraph of the Court's decision in Lopez explains that a decision uphold-
ing the challenged statute would require the Court 
to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by 
the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, 
giving great deference to congressional action. . . . The broad language in these opinions 
has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any 
further. 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 {1995) (citations omitted). Wickard was one of the 
"prior cases" referred to by the Court, see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556; indeed, the Court de­
scribed Wickard as "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority 
over intrastate activity." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. 
87. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) {1994) {defining "species" to include "any distinct popula­
tion segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature"); 
see also, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Threatened Status for the 
Alaska Breeding Population of the Steller's Eider, 62 Fed. Reg. 31,748 (1997) (listing the 
population of a sea duck that breeds in Alaska, but declining to list the balance of the species 
that lives in Russia). 
88. See Bald Eagle Protection Act, ch. 278, § 1, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (current version at 16 
u.s.c. § 668 {1985)). 
October 1998] The Commerce Clause Meets The Fly 197 
harmful activities whether or not the survival of the species is in 
doubt. Again, Congress has amended the Bald Eagle Protection 
Act to extend coverage to several species of eagles.89 (5) All insects 
- Congress could legislate to protect not only flies, but beetles, 
bees, and grasshoppers as well. The Marine Mammal Protection 
Act is the most analogous existing statute.90 (6) All wildlife - Con­
gress could act to save mammals, birds, reptiles, insects and all 
other wildlife. The ESA does more - the statute also protects 
plants - but it also does less - the ESA's protections only apply if 
a species has been listed as endangered or threatened. (7) All living 
things - Here the statute would cover wildlife, plants, and also vi­
ruses and microorganisms. The ESA does not reach this far. (8) 
All natural objects - Congress could pass an Earth Preservation 
Act that would add rocks, canyons, water, air, and other inanimate 
natural objects to the list of protected resources. There is no analo­
gous federal or state law. 
The question raised by the Fly case is whether a statute based 
on a broader aggregation can constitutionally be applied to a nar­
row category that lacks the required substantial relationship to in­
terstate commerce. The Court has not confronted that question. 
Indeed, the Court has said little about how far Congress can reach 
in aggregating activities or how one decides what aggregations are 
permissible.91 The few available clues counsel against overly broad 
aggregations. Lopez rejects any Commerce Clause test that every 
conceivable federal statute could satisfy.92 The Court's frequently 
stated concern about federalism pushes toward less sweeping aggre­
gations.93 And lower courts have rejected the contention that Con-
89. See 16 U.S.C. § 668; see generally MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EvoLUTION OF NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE LAW 89-98 (rev. ed. 1983) (describing the history and application of the two eagle 
statutes). 
90. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1994). 
91. Much to the chagrin of constitutional law scholars. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER & 
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 191 (13th ed. 1997) (wondering about the 
permissible scope of the aggregation theory employed in Wickard); STONE ET AL., supra note 
26, at 226 (asking what kinds of aggregation are allowed by Wickard). 
92. See supra text accompanying note 14; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
600 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (insisting that "[t]he aggregation principle is clever, but 
has no stopping point"); p AUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITU­
TIONAL DECJSIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 385 (3d ed. 1992) (asking if Wickard's 
aggregation principle "leave[s] anything to the requirement that an activity have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce"); Merritt, supra note 15, at 749 (contending that "[b]lindly 
transferring the aggregation principle from Wickard to other contexts distorts the meaning of 
Wickard and suggests that the decision is much broader than it was intended"). 
93. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2377-78 n.11 (1997) (describing fed­
eralism as "the unique contribution of the Framers to political science and political theory") 
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). The Court, however, has 
yet to rely on the teachings of federalism to guide its Commerce Clause aggregation deci-
198 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:174 
gress can satisfy the Commerce Clause simply by choosing a broad 
category of activities whose aggregate effect on interstate com­
merce is substantial.94 In that light, the congressional findings 
about the effects of endangered species generally do not preclude a 
Commerce Clause objection to the use of the takings provision to 
regulate the Fly's habitat, or the habitat of any other species with 
minimal connections to interstate commerce. 
Suppose, for example, that Congress wanted to protect Hsing­
Hsing, the panda in the National Zoo, and that it enacted two stat­
utes to achieve that end. The Hsing-Hsing Preservation Act, which 
makes it illegal to harm Hsing-Hsing, could be supported by find­
ings that people come from around the country to visit the pandas 
in the National Zoo. The Earth Preservation Act, which makes it 
illegal to damage or interfere with any of the natural objects of the 
earth, could be defended by findings recording the substantial effect 
that water, geological formations, animals, and other natural ob­
jects have on interstate commerce. Either law could be constitu­
tionally applied to a poacher who shot Hsing-Hsing in the National 
Zoo; the panda's connection to interstate commerce is manifest. 
Obviously, though, the Earth Preservation Act would cover a host 
of other activities. It could, for example, be applied to a Minnesota 
company that discharged toxic pollutants into the Mississippi River 
to the detriment of businesses and residents in numerous states 
downstream. The more difficult Commerce Clause case would in­
volve the application of the Earth Preservation Act to an activity 
that itself lacked a substantial relationship to interstate commerce, 
say a woman who mowed her lawn, thereby damaging a natural 
object of the earth. Absent any relationship between the particular 
natural object - her lawn - and interstate commerce, that appli­
cation would seem to fall beyond the scope of the Commerce 
Clause.95 If so, then absent any relationship between the Fly and 
interstate commerce, the fact that other endangered species are 
sions. See STONE ET AL., supra note 26, at 226 (observing that the Court's leading Commerce 
Clause decisions "do not discuss the values of federalism as the basis for the choices they 
make" about the appropriate level of aggregation). 
94. See United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 676 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the govern· 
ment's claim that "Congress need only identify a broad 'class of activities' and determine 
that, viewed in the aggregate, the class 'substantially affects' interstate commerce," and insist· 
ing instead that something relevant must connect the separate incidents and their effects on 
interstate commerce), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1189 (1998); United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 
1342, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993) (contending that a "limiting principle must apply to the 'class of 
activities' rule, else the reach of the Commerce Clause would be unlimited, for virtually all 
legislation is 'class based' in some sense of the term"), atfd., 514 U.S. 549 (1995)). 
95. The other possibility is that Congress could focus on the interstate connections of the 
lawnmower instead of the lawn. See infra text accompanying notes 139-44. 
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substantially related to interstate commerce would not be enough 
to justify the regulation of the Fly and its habitat. 
The biodiversity argument advanced by Judge Wald and Judge 
Henderson suffers from the same fl.aw. It is no doubt true, as they 
claim, that the loss of any species will diminish the number of re­
sources available for interstate commerce.96 It is also true, though, 
that any action that harms the earth could diminish the resources 
available for interstate commerce. The biodiversity argument 
comes close to saying that because the earth is necessary for inter­
state commerce, anything that adversely affects the earth can be 
regulated by Congress. Indeed, any action that harms anything can 
be said to affect interstate commerce because it is hard to imagine 
anything that could not serve as a resource used in interstate com­
merce. Such a loss of resources argument proceeds from the same 
premises that would justify the application of the Earth Preserva­
tion Act to any human activity. It would, in short, allow Congress 
to do anything. 
That is not to say that a regulated party can escape the Com­
merce Clause by placing itself in a narrow category that includes 
only activities that do not affect interstate commerce. That ploy has 
not worked.97 But suppose that Congress itself were to choose a 
narrow category. If Congress passed a Delhi Sands Flower-Loving 
Fly Act that specifically sought to preserve the habitat of the Fly, 
and only the Fly, then the aggregation principle would not save that 
statute. Assuming that any congressional findings accompanying a 
statute directed at the Fly would discuss that species instead of en­
dangered species in general, the case for linking the Fly to interstate 
commerce fails.98 But if Congress lacks the power to protect the 
Fly's habitat by enacting a statute specifically designed to achieve 
that goal, the case for allowing the BSA to be applied to the Fly's 
habitat would result in Congress being able to accomplish througp. a 
broad statute what it could not do with a narrow one. Something is 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60. 
97. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.) (re­
jecting a narrow aggregation under the federal arson statute because "[c]ategorize finely 
enough and the interstate effects evaporate and the statute is nullified"), cert. denied, 117 S. 
Ct. 2425 (1997); Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1996) (refusing to charac­
terize the appropriate category as the cultivation of marijuana without the intent to distribute 
because "[a]ny class of economic activities could be defined so narrowly as to cover only 
those activities that do not have a substantial impact on interstate commerce"); United States 
v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 734 (3d Cir. 1993) (contending that Wickard does not require "a 
showing of local or regional aggregation," and thus evaluating the cumulative effects of filling 
wetlands across the country). 
98. The case would succeed if the biodiversity argument was available, but there are diffi­
culties confronting that argument. See supra text accompanying note 96. 
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odd about conditioning the Commerce Clause power to accomplish 
a certain goal on Congress legislating far more broadly than 
necessary. 
Odd or not, a prominent strand in Commerce Clause jurispru­
dence leads toward that result. Judge Wald defended her focus on 
endangered species generally as sufficient to justify the regulation 
of the Fly's habitat by quoting part of the Court's admonition that 
"where a general regulatory scheme bears a substantial relation to 
commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising 
under the statute is of no consequence."99 Or as the Court put it 
when it upheld the application of the federal loansharking statute to 
a local extortionist in Perez v. United States, 100 if a statute regulates 
a "class of activities . . .  within the reach of the federal power, the 
courts have no power 'to excise as trivial, individual instances' of 
the class. "101 Both statements recognize that Congress is not only 
empowered to regulate interstate commerce, but also to enact stat­
utes that are necessary and proper to effectuate that power. The 
BSA establishes a general regulatory scheme that is related to com­
merce, so the intrastate and noncommercial nature of the Fly (and 
other species) could be irrelevant. 
The reading of both statements needed to make the particular 
characteristics of the Fly irrelevant raises a number of problems. 
Both statements depend upon the same broad reading of the activi­
ties that can be aggregated under Wickard described above.102 
Both statements :first appeared in Maryland v. Wirtz103 in a context 
that casts doubt upon a broad reading of Wickard. Wirtz sustained 
the extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act - originally upheld 
in the classic New Deal case of United States v. Darby104 - to em­
ployees of any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce. Justice 
Douglas feared that the enterprise concept could allow Congress to 
"devour the essentials of state sovereignty."105 But the Court as­
sured him that that was a misreading of Wickard: 
Neither here nor in Wickard had the Court declared that Congress 
may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for 
broad general regulation of state or private activities. Tue Court has 
99. National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1046, 1053 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (Wald, J.) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)). 
100. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
101. Perez, 402 U.S. at 154 (emphasis omitted). 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60. 
103. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
104. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
105. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 205 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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only said that where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial 
relation to interstate commerce, the de minimis character of individ­
ual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.106 
Actually, that is not too reassuring. It virtually invites Congress to 
legislate as broadly as possible: a statute will fall if the trivial im­
pacts dominate the substantial impacts, but a statute will survive if 
the substantial impacts dominate the trivial ones. In other words, if 
Congress gathers enough substantial impacts into the covered class, 
the trivial impacts can be regulated, too. Even so, it is not obvious 
that the substantial impacts associated with the ESA's takings pro­
vision prevail over the trivial impacts. The parties to the Fly case 
agreed that the constitutionality of the application of the statute to 
the Fly would decide the constitutionality of the statute as applied 
to other intrastate species, yet fully half of the listed species live in 
only one state.107 
The contention that Congress can regulate trivial and de 
minimis activities that are unrelated to interstate commerce sheds 
some light on an unexplained phenomenon: the absence of success­
ful as-applied challenges in Commerce Clause cases. Most constitu­
tional litigation is divided into facial challenges to an entire statute 
and individual challenges to particular applications of the statute, 
with the failure of a facial challenge in no way precluding a subse­
quent as-applied challenge. Not so in Commerce Clause cases. 
Courts often say that they are considering the constitutionality of a 
particular application of a statute under the Commerce Clause -
the Fly case itself is an example108 - but the fact that trivial in­
stances and de minimis applications are nonetheless within the 
scope of congressional power invariably dooms such challenges. 
The Court decides the constitutionality of legislation under the 
106. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196 n.27. 
107. See Envtl. Brief, supra note 52, at 1 (contending that the case "is about all of the 
more than 500 species that occur in only a single state, for the if the Constitution prevents the 
federal government from extending meaningful protection to the Delhi Sands flower-loving 
fly, then it almost certainly prevents that same government from extending such protection to 
the others"); U.S. Brief, supra note 28, at 1 (describing the issue presented in the case as 
"[w]hether Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to prevent the extinction of 
species by prohibiting takings of species listed as endangered, even where a particular species 
lives entirely within one State"); NAHB Brief, supra note 62, at 17 (indicating that the mu­
nicipalities and developers "challenge[d] the authority of the federal government to regulate 
the use of non-federal lands in order to protect a species of Fly that is found only in 
California"). 
108. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1040, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (Wald, J.) (indicating that the appellants challenged an application of the ESA's tak­
ings provision); see also United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining 
how to decide as-applied challenges to a statute possessing a jurisdictional element); Building 
Indus. Assn. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 908 (D.D.C. 1997) (describing an as-applied chal­
lenge to the ESA's takings provision). 
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Commerce Clause on an all-or-nothing basis. But it does not say 
why. 
Even so, the de rninirnis applications and trivial instances lan­
guage does not allow Congress to regulate anything so long as the 
substantial effects of an activity on interstate commerce are greater 
than the trivial effects. Consider the meaning of the necessary and 
proper clause in this context. Justice Black once wrote that "it has 
long been held that the Necessary and Proper Clause . . .  adds to 
the commerce power of Congress the power to regulate local instru­
mentalities operating within a single State if their activities burden 
the flow of commerce among the States."109 So stated, the Neces­
sary and Proper Clause explains the substantial effects test - the 
third prong of Lopez - but it still requires a showing that the regu­
lated activity affects interstate commerce when aggregated with 
similar activities. The activities must still be similar, so the aggrega­
tion question still remains. A broad reading of what is necessary 
and proper would justify, for example, the regulation of any activity 
affecting any natural object pursuant to the Earth Preservation Act 
hypothesized above. It thus violates the Lopez command that a 
permissible Commerce Clause test cannot allow Congress to regu­
late everything. 
What, then, do the de minimis and trivial instances statements 
mean? The best explanation appears in Judge Baldock's opinion 
sustaining an application of the Hobbs Act: "if a statute regulates 
an activity which, through repetition, in aggregate has a substantial 
affect on interstate commerce . . .  'the de minimis character of indi­
vidual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.' "110 
This reading clarifies that the de rninirnis principle attaches only 
after the threshold determination has been made that the aggre­
gated effects on the activity on interstate commerce are substantial. 
That requires the appropriate level of aggregation to be decided 
first, and if the effects of the activity once aggregated are substan­
tial, the fact that a particular case involves an instance that does not 
itself affect interstate commerce does not push that instance outside 
the scope of congressional power. Again, as Judge Baldock ex­
plains, Lopez does not "require the· government to show that indi­
vidual instances of the regulated activity substantially affect 
commerce."111 Thus the fact that one individual Delhi Sands 
109. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 271 (1964) (Black, J., 
concurring). 
110. United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995). 
111. Bolton, 68 F.3d at 399. 
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Flower-Loving Fly, or grizzly bear, or bald eagle is not related to 
interstate commerce does not limit the scope of the ESA's takings 
provision so long as the individual is part of a group whose aggre­
gate effect on interstate commerce is substantial. 
That approach reconciles the Lopez insistence on a Commerce 
Clause test that does not justify every federal statute with the Lo­
pez acceptance of the de rninirnis application principle. But the 
Supreme Court has never stated this view, and it is not the only 
possible reading of the contested statements. Judge Wald's broader 
approach to aggregation and her reading of the de minimis princi­
ple draws some support from cases in other contexts that decline to 
inquire about the specific regulated activity so long as a general fed­
eral statute imposes the regulation. CERCLA, for example, im­
poses liability on parties who were involved in the disposal of 
hazardous wastes. Most courts to consider commerce challenges to 
the statute have inquired about the relationship between the im­
proper disposal of hazardous wastes and interstate commerce.112 
The only court of appeals to consider the issue relied upon a nar­
rower category - the disposal of hazardous waste at the site of 
production - though the court found it unnecessary to actually de­
cide the appropriate category.113 No court has demanded proof of 
the relationship between the particular hazardous waste disposed 
by the defendant and interstate commerce, nor has any court taken 
the additional step of requiring a connection between a particular 
kind of hazardous waste - such as PCBs, zinc, lead, arsenic - and 
interstate commerce. Similarly, many civil rights statutes aggregate 
the effects of discrimination based on race, sex, age, and other bi­
ases without any suggestion that a narrower category - say, only 
race discrimination - is appropriate for Commerce Clause 
purposes. 
That does not mean that all endangered species can be treated 
alike, though. Each type of discrimination exists in eacQ. state; there 
is no intrastate type of discrimination paralleling the existence of 
endangered species that live in only one state. Nor is there any­
thing special about each specific hazardous substance, whereas the 
reason for protecting endangered species is that each species is 
unique. We may not be concerned if a deer gets killed because 
112. See, e.g., Nova Chem. Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098, 1106 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); 
United States v. NL Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 545, 562 (S.D. Ill. 1996); United States v. Alcan 
Aluminum Corp., No. 87-CV-920, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16358, at *19-*20 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 
25, 1996); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Agway, Inc., No. 92-CV-0748, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14196, 
at *30-*33 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1996). 
113. See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1510 & n.8 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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there are plenty of other deer, but if a Fly - or worse, a bald eagle 
- gets killed, we worry because that could lead to the extinction of 
the species. It is the loss of a species and its effect on biodiversity 
that concerns us more than the loss of an individual animal, plant, 
or insect. 
In sum, the effort to employ the aggregation principle to use the 
effects of endangered species generally on interstate commerce to 
justify the regulation of the Fly's habitat fails because that kind of 
aggregation would justify any federal legislation. Lopez teaches 
that such a result is impermissible. The narrowest view of aggrega­
tion is misplaced, too, because it would demand a showing of a rela­
tionship to interstate commerce in every individual case. That is 
the equivalent of requiring each federal statute to contain a jurisdic­
tional statement, but Lopez did not go so far as to hold that such a 
jurisdictional statement is the only way to comply with the limits of 
the Commerce Clause. The correct answer lies somewhere in the 
middle, between aggregating everything and aggregating nothing, 
with Congress given deference to choose what activities to combine 
- provided it explains why. 
B. The Potential Effect Problem 
Even if we do not receive any benefit from the Fly now, it is 
possible that in the future the Fly could become valuable to human 
society and exert a substantial effect on interstate commerce.114 
Congress was well aware of "the unknown uses that endangered 
species might have and about the unforeseeable place such crea­
tures may have in the chain of life on this planet. "115 The stories of 
other species that were once thought worthless but which later 
yielded valuable medicinal, nutritional and other services counsel 
humility before one dismisses the potential benefits of the Fly. But 
the potential effect argument will always be available because any­
thing is possible. It was conceivable that the possession of guns 
near a school could have a dramatic effect on interstate commerce, 
yet that speculative possibility was not enough to persuade the 
114. It is also possible that the Fly is already related to interstate commerce, but our 
limited understanding of natural processes prevents us from realizing that fact. That is the 
essence of Judge Wald's ecosystem argument: every species, including the Fly, has an actual 
effect on interstate commerce because every species is crucial to its ecosystem. That argu­
ment differs from the one discussed in this section because here I consider potential effects of 
the Fly that do not yet exist. 
115. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178-79 (1978); see also National Assn. 
of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F3d 1040, 1050-52 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Wald, J.) (citing con­
gressional committee reports reciting the potential effects of endangered species). 
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Court that the Commerce Clause justified the statute in Lopez. In­
deed, the scenario described in Lopez sounds more likely than the 
potential dire consequences of the loss of the Fly. So the potential 
effect argument must overcome the twin obstacles of transgressing 
the Lopez prohibition on a Commerce Clause test that justifies any 
federal statute and rendering Lopez itself wrongly decided. 
Most lower courts have not let those details stand in their way, 
especially in environmental cases.116 This trend may be changing in 
light of the recent invalidation of the regulation extending the juris­
diction of the Clean Water Act to wetlands that "could" be in­
volved in interstate commerce.117 Judge Sentelle was even more 
skeptical of relying upon anything short of an actual and ongoing 
effect on interstate commerce in the Fly case. He reasoned that 
because the Fly is not interstate, and the Fly is not commerce, the 
Fly cannot be interstate commerce.118 But that argument proves far 
too much. The very fact that a species has become endangered 
maximizes the likelihood that the species lives in only one state and 
that there is no commerce in the species. Indeed, almost half of the 
species protected by the ESA survive in only one state.119 Hawaii 
has the most endangered species,120 and is the state that is least 
likely to witness the travel of such species across state lines. The 
plants that are protected by the BSA are limited in their ability to 
move across state lines. And while some endangered species pos­
sess tremendous value in the black market as they become rarer, 
116. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the 
Eagle Protection Act because "[e]xtinction of the eagle would substantially affect interstate 
commerce by foreclosing any possibility of several types of commercial activity"); Cooper 
Indus., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14196, at *30 (holding the Commerce Clause empowers Con­
gress to regulate the disposal of hazardous wastes where there is a threat of water pollution); 
United States v. Sargent County Water Resource Dist., 876 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (D.N.D. 
1992) (finding that the Clean Water Act applies to isolated wetlands in part because of their 
"[p]otential rather than actual use by interstate travelers for recreational purposes . . . .  "); 
Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 995 (D. Haw. 1979) 
(upholding the ESA because it "preserves the possibilities of interstate commerce in these 
species and of interstate movement of persons" who would visit them), affd., 639 F.2d 495 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
117. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1997); see also United States 
v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125, 132-33 (6th Cir. 1996) (Batchelder, J., dissenting) (concluding that 
the fact that "many things, and for that matter, most people, 'retain the inherent potential to 
affect commerce' . . . . cannot suffice to give Congress the power to regulate or protect 
them"). 
118. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1061 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (in­
sisting that "the chances of validly regulating something which is neither commerce nor inter­
state under the heading of the interstate commerce power must . . .  be an empty recitation"). 
119. See Envtl. Brief, supra note 52, at 2. 
120. See U.S. Fish & Wtldlife Service, Listed Species By State!Territory as of June 30, 
1998, available at <http://www.fws.gov.r9endsppilistmap.html> (indicating that 298 different 
species listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA live in Hawaii). 
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the same scarcity reduces the amount of commerce that can actually 
occur in a species. In short, if the constitutionality of protecting an 
endangered species requires that the species be widespread and fa­
miliar to consumers, maybe our constitutional jurisprudence has 
achieved terminal silliness after all.121 
The dilemma, therefore, is to avoid either a Commerce Clause 
test that empowers Congress to regulate any potential effects or a 
test that denies Congress power unless an activity is currently in­
volved in interstate commerce. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce 
Commission122 suggests a solution. In Preseault, the Court rejected 
a Commerce Clause challenge to the National Trail System Act 
Amendments of 1983, which Congress enacted to preserve railroad 
rights-of-way that are not currently in service. The Court held that 
the statute was permissible under the Commerce Clause because it 
was "reasonably adapted to the goal of encouraging the develop­
ment of additional recreational trails."123 Further, the Court held 
that Congress could protect the rights-of-way for future railroad use 
because "Congress apparently believed that every line is a poten­
tially valuable national asset that merits preservation even if no fu­
ture rail use for it is currently foreseeable."124 Thus the 
government and the environmentalists in the Fly case relied on 
Preseault for the proposition that the protection of potential future 
value in interstate commerce is within Congress's authority under 
the Commerce Clause.125 
A potential effect on interstate commerce moves a step beyond 
an actual effect on interstate commerce, and the Court might not be 
willing to take that step. It becomes more attractive, though, as the 
likelihood that the effect will actually materialize increases. The 
statute in Preseault relied upon a future effect that, while not cur­
rently foreseeable, was predicated on the occurrence of the identi­
cal effect before. The protected land had been used for railroads in 
121. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 {1996) {Scalia, J., dissenting). I am not the 
first to make this observation. See Building Indus. Assn. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 908 
{D.D.C. 1997). 
122. 494 U.S. 1 {1990). 
123. Preseault, 494 U.S. at 18; see also 494 U.S. at 18 {describing the congressional intent 
'"to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service, to pro­
tect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient transportation use'" as 
"valid congressional objectives") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 98-28, at 8 (1983) and S. REP. No. 
98-1, at 9 {1983)). 
124. Preseault, 494 U.S. at 19. 
125. See Envtl. Brief, supra note 52, at 11; U.S. Brief, supra note 28, at 19-20. The gov­
ernment also cited Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 325-26 (1981), as an example of the Court 
upholding congressional authority to protect prime farm land. See U.S. Brief, supra note 28, 
at 20. 
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the past, and the continued existence of the rights-of-way supported 
the probability that the land would be used that way again. Such 
knowledge of a past effect on interstate commerce distinguishes 
Preseault, and a Commerce Clause test fashioned upon it, from a 
general willingness to allow Congress to enact any legislation based 
on speculation that an effect on interstate commerce will occur at 
some point in the future. 
This approach will produce mixed results for the ESA's takings 
provision. For species that were once involved in interstate com­
merce, the probability of a future effect is high if the BSA achieves 
its goal of eliminating the threat to the species. Eagles fall in this 
category,126 as do alligators and gray whales.127 For species like the 
Fly that were never involved in interstate commerce, the 
probability of a future effect is much lower and depends upon the 
discovery of a value that heretofore has been hidden. There are 
probably more of the latter kind of species than the former. The 
ability to regulate those species that have never affected interstate 
commerce necessitates either a broad aggregation principle such as 
that questioned above, or a broad reading of the ability of Congress 
to regulate future, yet substantial, effects. 
Thus Congress should be able to use its Commerce Clause 
power to regulate some but not all future substantial effects on in­
terstate commerce. Insisting upon a sufficient likelihood that the 
expected substantial effect will actually occur avoids the Lopez fear 
of allowing Congress to do anything in the name of what might hap­
pen someday. Congressional findings take on an added importance 
in this context as a way of demonstrating to the Court that even 
though the requisite effect has yet to occur, there is good reason to 
believe that it will. With no such reason for anticipating that the 
Fly will have such an effect on interstate commerce, the future ef­
fect must come instead from the lessons of endangered species gen­
erally, which requires the invocation of the aggregation principle. 
But that principle cannot be stretched to protect the Fly. 
126. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the 
Eagle Protection Act because "[e]xtinction of the eagle would substantially affect interstate 
commerce by foreclosing any possibili,ty of several types of commercial activity"); United 
States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237, 1244 (D. Or. 1996) (sustaining federal protection of 
eagles because eagle parts have been involved in interstate commerce). 
127. See U.S. Brief, supra note 28, at 20 n.9. 
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C. The Choice of Activity Problem 
Though they reached different conclusions, Judge Sentelle and 
Judge Wald both concentrated on the relationship between the ob­
ject of congressional protection - endangered species - and inter­
state commerce. Judge Henderson, by contrast, focused on the 
activities that threatened to doom the Fly. The difference is stark. 
If the connection between the hospital and interstate commerce is 
sufficient, then most of Judge Wald's opinion was unnecessary, and 
most of Judge Sentelle's dissent was misdirected. 
The appeal of this approach grows when it is compared to the 
actual strictures of the ESA. The challenged provision of the stat­
ute, as interpreted by the Fish & Wildlife Service, forbids any action 
that substantially interferes with the habitat of an endangered spe­
cies. Building a hospital on top of one of the few remaining homes 
of the Fly falls within that provision, as does building a residential 
subdivision in the same place. San Bernardino and the home build­
ers desire to engage in activities that the ESA's takings 'provision 
prohibits. Their activities, moreover, would substantially affect in­
terstate commerce. The analysis is exceptionally straightforward, 
but it indicates that Judge Henderson was right. 
Further proof comes from the Court's decisions upholding stat­
utes that prohibit the use of the channels of interstate commerce for 
purposes that Congress deems immoral. Congress has enacted stat­
utes prohibiting the transportation of numerous people and things 
across state lines for immoral purposes, and the Court has sustained 
them all.128 In each instance, the statute is motivated by a desire to 
protect someone or something that is affected by commerce, rather 
than something that affects commerce itself. The ESA's takings 
provision operates in the same manner. For many, the extinction of 
a species is an immoral act that should be excluded from interstate 
commerce to the extent possible. Bans on the sale of an endan­
gered species are the most obvious way of keeping rare animals and 
plants out of interstate commerce, but they are not the only way. 
The takings provision serves the same purpose to the extent that it 
applies to activities - like the construction of a hospital or a subdi-
128. See, e.g., Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936) (applying a federal kidnapping 
statute); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the White Slave Traffic Act's 
prohibition on taking a woman across state lines for immoral purposes); Champion v. Ames 
{The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding a federal anti-lottery statute); see also 
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 91, at 195 (noting that "the 'end' which is invoked in 
[Darby] to justify the local 'means' is the relationship of the local sanction to the ban on 
interstate shipments (not the relationship between the regulated local activity and a national 
commercial problem)"). 
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vision - that rely upon materials and workers involved in inter­
state commerce. Recall that the ESA's takings provision states that 
it is illegal "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."129 
The prohibition refers to those who engage in the harmful conduct, 
not to the protected species themselves. It regulates activities like 
building a hospital in the Fly's habitat; it does not regulate the Fly 
itself. As far as the law is concerned, the Fly is free to do whatever 
it wants. 
The takings provision reveals the ambiguity in the definition of 
the "activity" that substantially affects interstate commerce. This 
choice of activities problem necessitates an often unconscious deci­
sion to focus on a statute's means or a statute's ends for purposes of 
measuring the relationship of the activity to interstate commerce. 
Consider the challenges to the Freedom of Access to Clinic En­
trances Act (FACE),13o the statute enacted by Congress in 1994 in 
response to protests at abortion clinics. FACE criminalizes a vari­
ety of threatening activities that impede access to or intentionally 
damage abortion clinics. The statute has been challenged on Com­
merce Clause grounds, albeit unsuccessfully, by protesters whose 
conduct has ranged from peaceful to violent. When looking for the 
requisite connection to interstate commerce, most courts have em­
phasized the ways in which the clinics are related to interstate com­
merce.131 Only occasionally has a court considered the relationship 
between the protesters and interstate commerce.132 
In this context, FACE stands on stronger ground if the relevant 
activity is defined by reference to the ends of the statute rather than 
129. 16 u.s.c. § 1532(19) (1994). 
130. 18 u.s.c. § 248 (1994). 
131. See, e.g., United States v. Westin, No. 97-1348, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 20753, at *6 
(2d Cir. Aug. 25, 1998); Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 587 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 118 S. 
Ct. 1838 (1998); United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 677-82 (5th Cir. 1997); Terry v. Reno, 101 
F.3d 1412, 1415-18 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 2431 (1997); United States v. 
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919-20 (8th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 613 (1996); United 
States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 680-83 (7th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 47 (1996); Cheffer 
v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Bird, 124 F.3d at 674-75 (noting the 
absence of evidence that the particular clinic involved in the case had any relationship to 
interstate commerce). 
132. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 692 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the regulation ap­
plies to the activity of the demonstrators, not to the activity of the clinic itself'); United States 
v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 630 n.16 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (asserting that "FACE does not regu­
late abortion clinics, it regulates abortion protests"), revd., 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995); see 
also Terry, 101 F.3d at 1417 (declining to address whether FACE regulates protests instead of 
abortion clinics). Judge Wald characterized the activity at issue in the FACE cases as "intra­
state, noncommercial protest activity." National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 
1041, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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its means. It is easier to make the link between abortion clinics and 
interstate commerce than to make the link between abortion 
protesters and interstate commerce.133 This is the opposite of the 
BSA, where the means of the statute - prohibiting habitat destruc­
tion - are more closely related to interstate commerce than the 
end of protecting endangered species, however local the species 
may be. In other words, FACE protects a typically interstate activ­
ity by regulating typically intrastate actors, while the BSA protects 
typically intrastate creatures by regulating typically interstate 
activity. 
The FAGB cases could suggest that the activity that must be 
substantially related to interstate commerce is defined by the ends 
of the statute, rather than its means. If that were so, then the ap­
propriate question under the BSA is whether an endangered spe­
cies has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, so Judge 
Henderson's focus would be wrong. But either the means or the 
ends should be able to provide the requisite connection to interstate 
commerce. Surely the fact that a species is sold in stores across the 
country serves to justify congressional regulation of that species. 
Th.at being so, the fact that an interstate activity threatens an intra­
state species suffices under the Commerce Clause too. If, for exam­
ple, Congress enacted a statute providing that "the construction of 
any facility with a substantial relationship to interstate commerce 
shall be illegal if such construction threatens the habitat of an en­
dangered species," that would seem to fall squarely within the third 
line of cases listed in Lopez (and perhaps the other two lines of 
cases as well).134 The application of the BSA to the construction of 
a hospital or a housing development in the Fly's habitat is indistin­
guishable from that hypothetical statute. 
San Bernardino County loses on this view because of the sub­
stantial relationship of the hospital to interstate commerce. Th.at 
effect also means that Congress has the power to regulate all of the 
hospital's activities, ranging from environmental to employment to 
health concerns, so long as Congress acts consistently with other 
constitutional provisions. A theory that empowers Congress to 
adopt such all encompassing regulation will surely offend some, but 
133. The point is relative: some abortion protesters have a substantial relationship to 
interstate commerce themselves, but many more abortion clinics have a much stronger 
relationship. 
134. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,' 558-59 (1995) (stating that "Congress' 
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial rela· 
tionship to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate com­
merce" (citations omitted)). 
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the specter of such sweeping federal regulation would come as no 
surprise to any hospital administrator. The housing construction, 
electrical substation, traffic intersection and similar activities pro­
posed by the NAHB and the other opponents of the Fly would like­
wise fall within the scope of the Commerce Clause. 
That does not mean that Congress can prohibit all of the activi­
ties that threaten the Fly's habitat. Judge Henderson and Judge 
Wald both emphasized that their theories allowed federal regula­
tion only where it was interstate commerce that threatened an en­
dangered species.135 Takings of endangered species habitat that do 
not result from such interstate commercial activities lie beyond 
Congress's power. Three of the threats to the Fly's habitat illus­
trate the kinds of issues this distinction raises. The Fly suffers from 
(1) the recreational use of off-road vehicles (ORVs) that crush the 
Fly's habitat and interfere with its breeding, (2) the presence of 
non-native plants that alter the ecological balance upon which the 
Fly depends, and (3) the trampling of land - or Flies themselves -
by people walking in the area.136 These activities raise difficult 
Commerce Clause questions even under the theory that allows 
Congress to regulate the hospital and other construction within the 
Fly's habitat. 
The hardest case for Congress to regulate would involve chil­
dren walking barefoot across the Fly's habitat on their way to 
school. Lopez holds that any relationship to the school is inade­
quate to support Commerce Clause jurisdiction,137 and the children 
themselves offer no alternative justification for federal legislation. 
Transplanting a mustard plant from one's garden into the Fly's 
135. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1048 (Wald, J.) (finding the takings 
provision within congressional authority in cases "where the pressures of interstate com­
merce place the existence of the species in peril"); 130 F.3d at 1059 (Henderson, J., concur­
ring) (noting that the takings provision "here acts to regulate commercial development of the 
land inhabited by the endangered species"); 130 F.3d at 1060 n.6 (Henderson, J., concurring) 
(explaining that "[t]he rationale on which I rely permits regulation only of activities (includ­
ing land use) that adversely affect species that affect, or are involved in, interstate com­
merce"). Note that while the latter statement in Judge Henderson's opinion is ambiguous, 
the context shows that she must mean that the activities, not the species, "affect, or are in­
volved in, interstate commerce." 
136. See FWS Fly Listing Decision, supra note 2, at 49,884; FLY DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN, 
supra note 2, at 13-14 (detailing these threats to the Fly); see also FWS Fly Listing Decision, 
supra note 2, at 49,881 (advising that all of the five remaining populations of the Fly "are 
threatened by urban development activities"). 
137. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-66 (rejecting the government's argument that possession 
of a firearm in a local school zone substantially affects interstate commerce). 
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habitat presents a similarly problematic case.138 If the Commerce 
Clause reaches such activities, then it reaches anything. 
It is not much easier to reach the ORV users, other trampling 
activities, and other ways of introducing non-native plants. Presum­
ably, the ORV users enjoy their vehicles within the borders of Cali­
fornia, and it is even more likely that anyone walking through the 
Fly's habitat will stay within the state. Thus the only way that Con­
gress could reach such activity would be to regulate based on the 
interstate movement of the equipment itself. Most ORV manufac­
turers are located outside of California, so Congress could attempt 
to regulate the use of ORV's in endangered species habitat in the 
same way that Congress regulates a hospital because of its inter­
state connections. But that principle could be stretched to the point 
at which Congress could regulate anything. Children who trample 
the Fly's habitat on their way to school would seem to be the quin­
tessential local activity outside the scope of the Commerce Clause, 
but one can imagine Congress trying to reach even that activity 
based on the out-of-state manufacturer of the children's Nike shoes 
- and the shoes quite literally would be the instruments of the 
habitat's destruction.139 The same theory would hold that planting 
a 49¢ packet of mustard seeds bought at a local hardware store but 
produced out-of-state is within the scope of the Commerce Clause. 
These cases take the Commerce Clause a step beyond the regu­
lation of the hospital, the traffic intersections, and the construction 
of the residential subdivisions. Interstate commerce plays an ongo­
ing role in each of those cases: doctors and patients and suppliers 
travel to the hospital once it is operating, cars on interstate trips use 
the roads, and the construction of residential homes involves mater­
ials and workers from outside of California. Likewise, the hotel 
and restaurant at issue in the Civil Rights Act cases relied upon out­
of-state guests and food, respectively, on a continuing basis. The 
ORV users, children wearing Nike shoes, and gardeners planting 
seeds are different. The interstate connection in each of those cases 
has ceased. To allow Congress to regulate those activities anyway 
would, in Professor Gunther's words, drain the substantive content 
138. See FLY DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN; supra note 2, at 13 (noting that non-native plants 
such as mustard, Russian thistle, horehound, cheeseweed and many species of introduced 
grasses severely degrade the Fly's habitat because theY. affect the soil and available moisture). 
139. Cf. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. REs. L. 
Rav. 685, 686 (1996) (speculating about whether the Commerce Clause allows Congress to 
regulate someone wearing moccasins in their own home). 
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of the Commerce Clause "beyond any pdint yet reached."140 It 
nears, and may transgress, the Lopez command against a test that 
allows Congress to regulate anything. 
The ORV users, trampling children, and gardeners demonstrate 
the difficulty of drawing a clear line between what is substantially 
affected by interstate commerce and what is not. I do not offer such 
a line here. I do have an answer, though, albeit one based on an­
other notoriously vague concept: proximate cause. Professor 
Merritt has argued that these kinds of determinations should be 
made according to traditional proximate cause principles.141 A sub­
stantial effect exists where "the relationship between the regulated 
activity and interstate commerce [is] strong enough or close enough 
to justify federal intervention."142 Such a proximate cause test ex­
plains why Congress cannot rely on the Nike shoes worn by a 
school child to regulate the child's trampling of the Fly's habitat. In 
tort law, proximate cause principles would prevent Nike from being 
held liable if a child kicked and injured a classmate, even if the child 
was wearing Air Jordans at the time. So, too, the step from the 
child's actions to the provenance of the shoes would be beyond the 
reach of Congress under a proximate cause test for the Commerce 
Clause. Such a proximate cause determination is particularly suited 
for the ESA's takings provision because the substantive reach of 
the statute is already influenced by notions of proximate cause.143 
140. BREST & LEVINSON, supra note 92, at 399 {quoting a June 5, 1963 letter from Gerald 
Gunther to the Department of Justice regarding the proposed Civil Rights Act which stated 
that "the substantive content of the commerce clause would have to be drained beyond any 
point yet reached to justify the simplistic argument that all interstate activity may be sub­
jected to any kind of national regulation merely because some formal crossing of an inter­
state boundary once took place, without regard to the relationship between the aim of the 
regulation and interstate trade"). Tue inadequacy of these kinds of relationships is further 
illustrated by the cases where the connection to interstate commerce did not even satisfy the 
minimal requirements of a statute containing a jurisdictional statement. See, e.g., United 
States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328, 330-31 (11th Cir. 1996) {holding that delivering memos printed 
on a home computer to colleagues at work did not provide a sufficient nexus to interstate 
commerce); United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 526-27 (9th Cir. 1995) {holding that 
the provision of natural gas from out-of-state did not place a residential home within the 
scope of the Commerce Clause). 
141. See Merritt, supra note 139, at 691-92; Merritt, supra note 15, at 678-82; see also 
United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 189 {7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.) (commenting that the 
Commerce Clause argument rejected in United States v. Lopez would require "a pretty elon­
gated and speculative chain of causation, which if accepted might allow Congress to regulate 
any activity at all"). 
142. Merritt, supra note 15, at 679; see also id. at 681 {indicating that "some measure of 
the directness of the effect on interstate commerce" is part of this test and that a host of 
factors are relevant in determining whether the requisite proximity exists). A proximate 
cause test would thus avoid comparisons of Commerce Clause jurisprudence to the six de­
grees of Kevin Bacon game. See Linehan, supra note 17, at 382 & n.107. 
143. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 
687, 711-14 {1995) {O'Connor, J., concurring). But see 515 U.S. at 733-36 {Scalia, J., dissent-
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The idea has broader significance, though, because it offers a means 
by which activities affected by interstate commerce can be sepa­
rated from those that are not. That separation, in tum, answers 
Judge Sentelle's concern that allowing Congress to regulate activi­
ties affected by interstate commerce, instead of those that affect in­
terstate commerce, places everything within the scope of the 
Commerce Clause.144 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Fly is a relative latecomer to our nation's debate over Con­
gress's commerce power. It raises new questions, though, that tran­
scend the traditional disputes about the meaning of commerce and 
the amount of effect needed to invoke congressional authority. 
Those questions do not necessarily lend themselves to answers that 
justify the ESA's protection of the Fly. Judge Wald's need to rely 
upon a broad aggregation principle and the potential effects of the 
Fly reveals the inability of the Court's existing precedents to readily 
encompass the Fly. If Lopez was serious about rejecting any under­
standing of the Commerce Clause that would justify any federal ac­
tion, then the focus of Judge Wald's opinion may not save the Fly. 
Judge Henderson suffers from no such problem. The hospital is en­
gaged in interstate commerce, the hospital could wipe out the Fly, 
so the hospital may be subjected to the regulation of the BSA. By 
contrast, activities that lack a substantial relationship to interstate 
commerce lie outside the scope of the Commerce Clause no matter 
how damaging they are to the Fly. 
Even if Judge Sentelle's analysis prevails and the Supreme 
Court holds in a future case that the Commerce Clause does not 
authorize the application of the BSA to the habitat of species that 
are located in only one state, that would not doom federal efforts to 
protect endangered species. The takings provision might be defen­
sible under the treaty power or under the Property Clause.145 Al­
ternately, the BSA bans trade in endangered species, which even 
ing) (questioning the use of causation principles when interpreting the ESA's takings 
provision). 
144. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (contending that the focus on things that affect the Fly's 
habitat "improperly inverts the third prong of Lopez and extends it 'vithout limit"). 
145. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act as an exercise of the treaty power); Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources, 
471 F. Supp. 985, 995 n.40 (D. Haw. 1979) (speculating that the property clause may support 
the constitutionality of the ESA's takings provision). 
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Judge Sentelle concedes is justified by the Commerce Clause.146 
The BSA also authorizes the federal government to purchase the 
habitat of endangered species to be managed for the preservation 
of the species.147 The purchase of endangered species habitat 
avoids the Commerce Clause controversies and the allegations that 
the takings provision works a constitutional taking of private prop­
erty requiring just compensation to the landowner. Also, most 
states have acted to protect the endangered species in their midst, 
and private organizations such as the Nature Conservancy spend 
millions of dollars each year acquiring endangered species habitat 
so that they can preserve it. The Fish & Wildlife Service has also 
employed public education campaigns to persuade private individu­
als to protect endangered species like the Fly.148 But as worthy as 
these efforts have been, Congress remains unpersuaded that they 
can replace the protective function served by the ESA's takings 
provision. 
So the Commerce Clause fights will continue. The questions are 
different now, but the underlying debates about the meaning of our 
federal system remain the same. What we do not yet know is 
whether the understanding of federalism that produced Lopez and 
other recent decisions will be the understanding that influences the 
answers to those questions. For that we must wait because the 
Court declined to meet the Fly. 
146. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a), ( d)-(f) (1994); see also National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 
F.3d at 1063 n.1 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (noting that "Congress may have the authority to 
prevent interstate transportation of flies," and "prohibiting the local possession and exchange 
of flies might arguably be necessary to preventing interstate transportation or exchange of 
flies"). 
147. See 16 U.S.C. § 1534. See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 
83 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 82 (1997) (arguing that "federal ownership, not regulation of private 
land uses, should be the centerpiece of our national biodiversity conservation strategy"). 
148. See FLY DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 2, at 35 (proposing a public outreach 
effort to teach people about "the unique and vanishing ecosystem that the Delhi sands 
flower-loving fly represents"). 
